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Is something really wrong with macroeconomics?
Ricardo Reis1
LSE
August 2017
Abstract
Many critiques of the state of macroeconomics are off target. Current macroeconomic research 
is not mindless DSGE modelling filled with ridiculous assumptions and oblivious of data. Rather, 
young macroeconomists are doing vibrant, varied, and exciting work, getting jobs, and being 
published. Macroeconomics informs economic policy only moderately, and not more than nor 
differently from other fields in economics. Monetary policy has benefitted significantly from this 
advice in keeping inflation under control and preventing a new Great Depression. 
Macroeconomic forecasts perform poorly in absolute terms and given the size of the challenge 
probably always will. But relative to the level of aggregation, the time horizon, and the amount of 
funding, macroeconomic forecasts are not so obviously worse than those in other fields. What is 
most wrong with macroeconomics today is perhaps that there is too little discussion of which 
models to teach and too little investment in graduate-level textbooks. 
Keywords:  Methodology; Graduate teaching; Forecasting; Public debate 
JEL classification codes: A11, B22, E00 
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I. Introduction
I accepted the invitation to write this essay and take part in this debate with great 
reluctance. The company is distinguished and the purpose is important. I expect the effort and 
arguments to be intellectually serious. At the same time, I call myself an economist and I have 
achieved a modest standing in this profession on account of (I hope) my ability to make some 
progress thinking about and studying the economy. I have no expertise in studying economists. I 
go to work every day to understand why inflation goes up and down or why some fiscal systems 
deliver better outcomes than others. Making progress on these questions frequently requires 
taking detours into narrow technical points on definitions of equilibrium or the properties of 
statistical estimators. But the focus always remains on understanding the economy, not the 
profession of economics. I personally love reading biographies and delight in thinking about 
what a young Alfred Marshall would say to a young Kenneth Arrow. Yet, I do not confuse these 
pleasurable intellectual leisure times with my job as a researcher.
On top of this, asking an active researcher in macroeconomics to consider what is wrong 
with macroeconomics today is sure to produce a biased answer. The answer is simple: 
everything is wrong with macroeconomics. Every hour of my workday is spent identifying where 
our knowledge falls short and how can I improve it. Researchers are experts at identifying the 
flaws in our current knowledge and in proposing ways to fix these. That is what research is. So, 
whenever you ask me what is wrong with any part of economics, I am trained by years on the 
job to tell you many ways in which it is wrong. With some luck, I may even point you to a paper 
that I wrote proposing a way to fix one of the problems. 
While preparing for this article, I read many of the recent essays on macroeconomics 
and its future. I agree with much of what is in them, and benefit from having other people reflect 
about economists and the progress in the field. But to join a debate on what is wrong with 
economics by adding what is wronger with economics is not terribly useful. In turn, it would have 
been easy to share my thoughts on how macroeconomic research should change, which is, 
unsurprisingly, in the direction of my own research. I could have insisted that macroeconomics 
has over-relied on rational expectations even though there are at least a couple of well-
developed, tractable, and disciplined alternatives. I could have pleaded for research on fiscal 
policy to move away from the over-study of what was the spending of the past (purchases) and 
to focus instead on the spending that actually dominates the government budget today 
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(transfers). Going more methodological, I could have elaborated on my decade-long frustration 
dealing with editors and journals that insist that one needs a model to look at data, which is only 
true in a redundant and meaningless way and leads to the dismissal of too many interesting 
statistics while wasting time on irrelevant theories.  However, while easy, this would not lead to 2
a proper debate. A problem that too often plagues these discussions is that each panelist takes 
turns stating something else that is wrong with economics and pushing in a different direction. 
By the end, no opposing views are voiced, and the audience feels safe to agree with everything 
that was said while changing nothing in its day-to-day work, because there seem to be too many 
alternatives.
With all these caveats in mind, this essay will instead provide a critical evaluation of the 
state of macroeconomics. I will discuss four uses of macroeconomics, from those that are, in my 
view, less wrong, to those that perhaps need more change: research, policy, forecasting, and 
teaching. To contribute to the debate, I focus on responding to some of the negative verdicts on 
what is wrong with macroeconomics. The goal is to prevent these criticisms from being read as 
undisputed facts by the users of knowledge as opposed to the creators of knowledge. In 
substantive debates about actual economic policies, it is frustrating to have good economic 
thinking on macro topics being dismissed with a four-letter insult: it is a DSGE. It is worrying to 
see the practice of rigorously stating logic in precise mathematical terms described as a flaw 
instead of a virtue. It is perplexing to read arguments being boxed into macroeconomic theory 
(bad) as opposed to microeconomic empirical work (good), as if there was such a strong 
distinction. It is dangerous to see public grant awards become strictly tied to some 
methodological directions to deal with the crisis in macroeconomics. I am not, in any way, 
claiming that there are no problems in macroeconomics, or that there should be no changes. My 
goal is not to claim that there is no disease, but rather to evaluate existing diagnoses, so that 
changes and progress are made in a productive direction.
II. The present of macroeconomic research
Mortality imposes that the future of macroeconomics will be shaped by the youngest 
members of the profession. There is something wrong with a field when bright young minds no 
longer find its questions interesting, or just reproduce the thoughts of close-minded older 
members. There is something right with it when the graduate students don't miss the weekly 
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seminar for work in progress, but are oblivious of the popular books in economics that 
newspapers and blogs debate furiously and tout as revolutionizing the field. To evaluate the 
state of macroeconomic research, as opposed to policy or the history of ideas, one should 
confront evaluations with evidence on what active researchers in the field are working on. Nobel 
prizes get most of the attention, and speeches of central bankers about their internal models are 
part of policy debates. But neither are the right place to look for the direction of the field. More 
accurate measures of the state of macroeconomics are what the journals have recently 
published, or what the recent hires of top departments are working on.
A good place to start is to read what some representative young macroeconomists 
actually work on. The Review of Economic Studies foreign editors select around 6 economists 
every year that were just on the academic job market to give a tour of a handful of European 
institutions and present their research. These are not necessarily the best economists, or the 
ones that had more job offers, but they are typically the candidates that the editors are more 
excited about and that got more attention in the job market. Because the composition of the jury 
that picks them is heterogeneous and changes regularly, the choices are arguably not biased in 
the direction of a particular field, although they are most likely all in the mainstream tradition.  3
Looking at their work gives a sample of what macroeconomic research is today. While they are 
at the top of the distribution when it comes to quality, these dissertation theses are fairly 
representative of what modern research in macroeconomics looks like. Here is my short 
description of what that is for the last 8 macroeconomists (with graduation date, PhD school, 
and first job in parentheses):
Martin Beraja (2016, Chicago, MIT): Beraja’s job market paper developed a new method to 
identify the effectiveness of policies within models where the researcher is uncertain about 
some features of the economy that the data has a hard time distinguishing. His focus is on 
identification in DSGE models that assume incomplete financial markets and sticky wages and 
this comes with clear applications to questions of redistribution via fiscal policy across states.
Arlene Wong (2016, Northwestern, Princeton): Wong used micro data to show that it is mostly 
young people who adjust their consumption when monetary policy changes interest rates. 
Younger people are more likely to obtain a new mortgage once interest rate changes, either to 
buy a new home or to refinance an old one, and to spend new available funds. Her research 
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has painstaking empirical work that focuses on the role of mortgages and their refinancing 
features, and a model with much heterogeneity across households.
Adrien Auclert (2015, MIT, Stanford): Auclert also focused on how changes in monetary policy 
affect spending and the macroeconomy, and also emphasized the heterogeneous responses by 
different households. He argued that when central banks lower interest rates, households 
whose assets have shorter duration than their liabilities lose out to households whose assets 
are of longer maturity than their liabilities. He then found that in the data the winners from these 
cuts in interest rates have higher propensity to spend than the losers, so that cuts in interest 
rates will boost aggregate spending.
Gregor Jarosch (2015, Chicago, Stanford): Jarosch writes a model to explain why losing your 
job leads to  a very long-lasting decline in your lifetime wages. His hypothesis is that this is due 
to people climbing a ladder of jobs that are increasingly secure, so that when one has the 
misfortune of losing a job, this leads to a fall down the ladder and a higher likelihood of having 
further spells of unemployment in the future. He uses administrative social security data to find 
some evidence for this hypothesis.
Luigi Bocola (2014, Penn, Northwestern): Bocola tries to explain the depth of the crisis in Italy 
after 2011. He writes a DSGE model where banks hold sovereign debt, so that bad news about 
a possible future sovereign default both puts a strain on the funding of banks but also induces 
them to cut their leverage as a precautionary reaction. This channel for the diabolic loop linking 
banks and sovereign debt fits reasonably well the behavior of credit spreads across Italian 
banks and firms, and predicts that the ECB’s interventions had a small effect.
Saki Bigio (2012, NYU, Columbia): Bigio wanted to understand why banks don't recapitalize fast 
enough after suffering large losses during a financial crisis, and this seems to be related with 
the slump in lending and real activity that follows these crises. His explanation is that after large 
losses, banks are less able to tolerate further losses, which lowers their ability to intermediate, 
and so their future profits. Equity holders can then be stuck in a coordination failure, where no 
one wants to inject new equity unless others do so as well, banks are stuck in a low profit 
equilibrium, and the recovery must come through the slow process of retaining earnings by 
banks.
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Matteo Maggiori (2012, Berkeley, NYU): Maggiori postulates that countries with more developed 
financial markets are able to better deal with lack of funding in a financial crisis. They use this 
ability to sell insurance to less developed countries, so that in normal times they receive an 
insurance premium in the form of capital gains on foreign investments that sustain persistent 
trade deficits. During a crisis though, the advanced countries should suffer the heaviest of 
capital losses and a larger fall in consumption, a prediction consistent with what happened in 
the United States, but less so with what happened in Germany during the Euro crisis.
Joe Vavra (2012, Yale, Chicago): Vavra used data on individual prices to find that changes in 
prices tend to be more dispersed and more frequent in recessions. He explains this by firms 
adjusting more often their prices in recessions, in spite of the costs of doing so, because the 
volatility of their firm-specific productivity is higher. But, with this more frequent price adjustment, 
monetary policy shocks will be less effective at boosting real activity in recessions.
In my reading, this is all exciting work, connected to relevant applied questions, and that 
takes data and models seriously. In contrast, in the caricatures of the state of macroeconomics, 
there are only models with representative agents, perfect foresight, no role or care for inequality, 
and a cavalier disregard for financial markets, mortgage contracts, housing, or banks. 
Supposedly, macroeconomic research ignores identification and does not take advantage of 
plentiful microeconomic data to test its models, which anyway are too divorced from reality to be 
useful for any real world question. Compare this caricature with the research that I just 
described: the contrast is striking. Not a single one of these bright young minds that are the 
future of macroeconomics writes the papers that the critics claim are what all of macroeconomic 
research is like today. Instead, what they actually do is to mix theory and evidence, time-series 
aggregate data and micro data, methodological innovations and applied policy questions, with 
no clear patterns of ideology driven by geography.
Blanchard (2016), Korinek (2015) and Wren-Lewis (2017) worry that the current 
standards and editorial criteria in macroeconomics undermine promising ideas, deter needed 
diversity in the topics covered, and impose mindless work on DSGEs that brings little useful 
knowledge to policy discussions. Smith (2016) emphasizes that we have far less data than what 
we would need to adequately test our models, and Romer (2016) that identification is the 
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perennial challenge for social sciences. Smith (2014) and Coyle and Haldane (2014) 
characterize the state of economics, not as the perennial glass half full and half empty, but 
rather as two glasses, one full and the other empty. In their view, applied empirical economists 
have been celebrating their successes, while macroeconomists lament their losses. 
All of these criticisms contain some truth, but only up to a point. The research that I have 
just described is diverse, creative, and uses different data to identify causes. Young researchers 
in macroeconomics today do not seem bound by current standards or afraid to get their hands 
dirty. They are attacking these big challenges and trying to overcome the criticisms. The data 
and tools used by applied empirical economists are also used by macroeconomists. This is a 
sign of a field full of vitality, not of a field in trouble.
One might make the (elitist) criticism that, by focusing on these papers, I have looked 
only at the disruptive work that may cause scientific revolutions, while the problem is on what 
goes on in normal macroeconomic science. Table 3 reports the articles published in the latest 
issue of the top journal in macroeconomics, the Journal of Monetary Economics, including their 
authors, the title of the paper, and the highlights that the authors submitted. These include: 
theoretical papers on sovereign debt crises and capital controls, applied papers on the 
interrelation between financial indicators and macroeconomic aggregates, papers looking at 
extreme events like catastrophes and liquidity traps, and even purely empirical papers on 
measuring uncertainty in micro data and on forecasting time series in the macro data. There is 
originality and plurality, and a significant distance from the critics’ portrayal of research.
Table 1. Articles in the Journal of Monetary Economics, volume 84, December 2016 
Authors Title Highlights
Gilles 
Chemla, 
Christopher 
A. Hennessy
Government as 
borrower of first 
resort
• A privately informed firm issues debt to a speculator and investors in safe assets.
• With high uninformed safe asset demand, the private sector may pool at risky debt.
• The government can increase welfare by issuing safe bonds, crowding out risky debt.
• Government may eliminate risky debt and portfolio distortions, reducing investment.
• Government debt can accommodate risky debt and distortions, encouraging investment.
David S. 
Miller
Commitment 
versus discretion in 
a political economy 
model of fiscal and 
monetary policy 
interaction
• Microfounding fiscal policy affects monetary policy decisions.
• Time inconsistency is alleviated by the politically distorted fiscal authority.
• Monetary responses mitigate the political distortion׳s effect.
• Price commitment results in lower welfare as it eliminates monetary responses.
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Vasco 
Cúrdia, 
Michael 
Woodford
Credit Frictions 
and Optimal 
Monetary Policy
• A positive average spread has little quantitative effect in the transmission of shocks.
• Time variation in credit spread affects the relation between spending and policy rate.
• Time variation in credit spread affects the relation between inflation and real activity.
• Basic NK optimal target criterion is approximately optimal with credit spread.
• The target criterion can be implemented by an augmented forward-looking Taylor rule.
Christian 
Gollier
Evaluation of long-
dated assets: The 
role of parameter 
uncertainty
• The parametric uncertainty affecting the annual growth rate magnifies long run risks.
• It makes the term structure of interest rates decreasing, because of prudence.
• It makes the term structure of risk premia increasing, because of risk aversion.
• The uncertain trend or volatility of growth has a strong impact on asset prices.
• The uncertain frequency of catastrophes plays a similar role.
Daniel 
Shoag, Stan 
Veuger
Uncertainty and 
the geography of 
the great recession
• Local policy uncertainty during the Great Recession matches unemployment outcomes.
• This relationship is robust to numerous controls.
•Increased uncertainty contributed to the severity of the Great Recession.
Zhu Wang, 
Alexander L. 
Wolman
Payment choice 
and currency use: 
Insights from two 
billion retail 
transactions
• Rich transactions data covering payment patterns for 3 years, thousands of stores.
• Consistent with theory of consumers׳ threshold transaction size for cash use.
• Across transaction size, cash share falls and dispersion across locations rises.
• Cash share displays weekly and monthly cycles, correlated with transaction volume.
• Over the longer term, cash share has declined, largely replaced by debit.
Andrea L. 
Eisfeldt, Tyler 
Muir
Aggregate external 
financing and 
savings waves
• Provide external finance cost time series using firm financing and savings decisions.
• Estimated average cost of external finance is 2.3%.
• Provide evidence of external finance cost shocks.
• Formally reject nested model without external finance cost shocks.
• Document external finance and savings waves.
Adrien 
Auclert, 
Matthew 
Rognlie
Unique equilibrium 
in the Eaton–
Gersovitz model of 
sovereign debt
• The Eaton–Gersovitz model is widely used for empirical analyses of sovereign debt 
markets.
• We show that the model with exogenous default value and short-term debt admits a 
unique equilibrium.
• This counters the common view that sovereign debt markets are prone to multiple 
equilibria.
• Multiplicity requires altering the timing of the model, or considering long-term debt.
Gianluca 
Benigno, 
Huigang 
Chen, 
Christopher 
Otrok, 
Alessandro 
Rebucci, Eric 
R. Young
Optimal capital 
controls and real 
exchange rate 
policies: A 
pecuniary 
externality 
perspective
• A new literature studies the use of capital controls to prevent financial crises.
• We show that if exchange rate policy has no cost, there is no need for capital controls.
• If the exchange rate policy is costly, capital controls become part of the optimal policy mix.
• This mix combines capital controls in tranquil times with exchange rate policy in crisis 
times.
• It yields more borrowing, fewer and less sever crises, and higher welfare than capital 
controls alone.
Marco Cozzi, 
Giulio Fella
Job displacement 
risk and severance 
pay
• We study the insurance role of severance pay in the presence of displacement risk.
• Post-displacement earnings losses are sizeable and persistent due to loss of tenure.
• Asset markets are incomplete.
• We find that severance pay entails substantial welfare gains.
• These welfare gains are negligible if earnings losses are not persistent.
Michael 
Abrahams, 
Tobias 
Adrian, 
Richard K. 
Crump, 
Emanuel 
Moench, Rui 
Yu
Decomposing real 
and nominal yield 
curves
• A term structure model for nominal and inflation-indexed government bonds.
• Model is used to decompose yields into expectations and risk premia.
• Variations in nominal term premia are primarily due to movements in real term premia.
• LSAP announcements lowered yields mainly through a reduction of real term premia.
• Monetary policy surprises primarily affect real forwards through real term premia.
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Yet, according to De Grauwe (2009) “The science of macroeconomics is in deep 
trouble.” while Skidelsky (2009) thinks that there has already been a “…discrediting of 
mainstream macroeconomics”. These opinions express feelings more than facts, so it is hard to 
debate them. But if the collapse in the reputation of macroeconomists was as large as they 
claim, there should be hints of it at least in some rough measures of academic output and 
prestige. Space in the top journals in the economics profession is scarce. If macroeconomics 
was in a crisis, journals would, at least slowly, publish fewer and fewer articles on 
macroeconomics. From the demand side, general interest journals would not be interested in 
publishing articles that non-macroeconomists have no interest in reading. From the supply side, 
enough articles in a field must be written for a select few to be of enough quality to pass the 
difficult standards of these top journals. 
Card and Della Vigna (2013) split the papers published in the top general-interest 
journals in the profession according to their field. They find no discernible change in the share of 
articles on macroeconomics over the last four decades. Figure 1 uses their approach, with some 
slight changes, by plotting the share of articles on macroeconomics, identified by a JEL code of 
E, that were published in the official journals of the two largest regional associations in 
economics, the American Economic Association and the European Economic Association. The 
sample goes from the start of 2000 to the end of 2016, so there are roughly as many years after 
the start of the Great Recession, as there are before. Publication in the two journals follow the 
Domenico 
Giannone, 
Francesca 
Monti, 
Lucrezia 
Reichlin
Exploiting the 
monthly data flow 
in structural 
forecasting
• A framework for combining structural models and now-casting is proposed.
• Conditions for deriving the monthly dynamics of the model are discussed.
• Linking the model with auxiliary variables improves now-casting performance.
• The proposed model traces in real time the shocks driving the business cycle.
Lena Mareen 
Boneva, R. 
Anton Braun, 
Yuichiro Waki
Some unpleasant 
properties of 
loglinearized 
solutions when the 
nominal rate is 
zero
• We show that it matters how one solves the New Keynesian model at the zero lower 
bound (ZLB).
• The nonlinear solution exhibits new types of ZLB equilibria that cannot occur using a 
loglinearized solution.
• Fiscal multipliers are small and orthodox at the ZLB for a large and plausible set of 
parameterizations of the model.
• The New Keynesian model can be used to make a case for supply-side fiscal stimulus at 
the ZLB.
• In situations where a labor tax rate cut increases employment, the government purchase 
multiplier is about one or less.
Yang K. Lu, 
Robert G. 
King, Ernesto 
Pasten
Optimal reputation 
building in the New 
Keynesian model
• We study how reputation building affects the optimal committed policy.
• The reputation building effect can overturn the conventional policy prescriptions.
• The reputation building effect is quantitatively important.
• The reputation building effect is relevant over a large parameter space.
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same trend: if anything, the share of papers in macroeconomics has been increasing over time. 
Figure 1 plots also the share of working papers published by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research on macroeconomic topics to account for possible lags in the decline in 
macroeconomics due to publication delays. While there was a temporary decline in the share of 
macroeconomic papers right after 2008, for the past 5 years it has been steadily rising, and is 
now at the highest level of the past 12 years.
A related criticism of macroeconomics is that it ignores financial factors. 
Macroeconomists supposedly failed to anticipate the crisis because they were enamored by 
models where financial markets and institutions were absent, as all financing was assumed to 
be efficient (De Grawe, 2009, Skidelsky, 2009). The field would be in denial if it continued to 
ignore these macro-financial links. Figure 2 checks this hypothesis in the article database 
measuring the share of papers in the journals that have both the E and the G JEL fields, so they 
contain research at the intersection of both macroeconomics and finance. The figure shows that 
research in macro-finance has increased continuously over the sample. The share of macro-
finance papers more than doubled for both the AER and the NBER from pre to post crisis, but 
was already on the rise since 2000. Of the increase in the macro share on average between 
2000-07 and 2009-16, which was 3.7%, 2.0%, and 5.1% for the AER, JEEA and NBER 
respectively, a very large part of it is accounted by macro-finance papers, which increased by 
4.3%, 1.3%, and 3.9%, respectively. Almost half of all macroeconomic papers in the AER in 
2012 were also listed as finance papers. A more anecdotal piece of evidence comes from the 
2012 survey by Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov (2013) on macroeconomics with 
financial frictions. It runs for 93 pages, it cites 177 references, most written before the crisis, and 
it references 6 other books and surveys that the authors state that one must read to get a full 
picture of the research on the intersection between macroeconomics and financial factors. One 
can safely argue that there is a hole in our knowledge of macro financial interactions; one might 
also argue more controversially that economists have filled this hole with rocks as opposed to 
diamonds; but it is harder to argue that the hole is empty.
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Figure 1. Share of macro and macro-finance papers published in the AER, JEEA and NBER
Figure 2. Share of macro-finance papers published in the AER, JEEA and NBER
Finally, on the demand side, macroeconomics can only have a future if there are still 
academic jobs for the young macroeconomists. Figure 3 shows the share of job posting in Jobs 
Openings for Economists, the main board for job advertisements for freshly minted PhDs, that 
again list macroeconomics as identified by its JEL code as the desired hire. The share is 
 11
remarkably constant over the past 15 years. At least for now, the marketplace seems to 
continue to appreciate what macroeconomists do.
Figure 3. Share of macro listings in Job Market Openings
Surely, when looking back in the future, some current directions of research will have 
turned out to have been unproductive or even misguided. Journals have many flaws, and 
editors and referees are naturally biased towards propagating old paradigms, and to stick up for 
their turfs. But my reading of the evidence is that macroeconomic research is not on the path to 
self-destruction implied by its critics. Looking at the current research frontier led to a different 
description from the one that one gets from the critics, and one that is at odds with the 
pessimistic tone of their criticisms. 
III. The performance of macroeconomic policy
Among all fields of economics, macroeconomics seems to be one of the ones that 
attracts the most attention by the popular media. At the same time, macroeconomists are very 
far from running the world. In deciding the size of the budget deficit, or whether a fiscal stimulus 
or austerity package is adopted, macroeconomists will often be heard by the press or 
policymakers, but almost never play a decisive role in any of the decisions that are made. Most 
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macroeconomists support countercyclical fiscal policy, where public deficits rise in recessions, 
both in order to smooth tax rates over time and to provide some stimulus to aggregate demand. 
Looking at fiscal policy across the OECD countries over the last 30 years, it is hard to see too 
much of this advice being taken. Rather, policy is best described as deficits almost all the time, 
which does not match normative macroeconomics. Moreover, in popular decisions, like the vote 
in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, macroeconomic considerations seemed to 
play a very small role in the choices of voters.  Critics that blame the underperformance of the 4
economy on economists vastly overstate the influence that economists actually have on 
economic policy.
One area where macroeconomists have perhaps more of an influence is in monetary 
policy. Central banks hire more PhD economists than any other policy institution, and in the 
United States, the current and past chair of the Federal Reserve are distinguished academic 
macroeconomists, as have been several members of the FOMC over the years. In any given 
week, there are at least one conference and dozens of seminars hosted at central banks all 
over the world where the latest academic research is discussed. The speeches of central bank 
governors refer to academic papers in macroeconomics more than those by any other 
policymaker.
Looking at the major changes in the monetary policy landscape of the last few decades
—central bank independence, inflation targeting, financial stability—they all followed long 
academic literatures. Even individual policies, like increasing transparency, the saturation of the 
market for reserves, forward guidance, and balance-sheet policy were adopted following 
academic arguments and debates. In the small sub-field of monetary economics, one can at 
least partially assess its successes and failures in the real world by judging how central banks 
have done over the past few decades. 
Every central bank that I know of in the developed world is in charge of keeping inflation 
low and stable. Some central banks have this as their only goal, others as one of several, but 
there is strong agreement across societies as reflected in central bank mandates that central 
banks can control inflation in the long run and keeping it stable is their main task. Figure 4, 
reproduced and updated from Reis (2016), compares the performance of four major central 
banks with regards to the measure of the price level that is stated in their legal mandates. In red 
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is the actual outcome, in dashed blue is the target moving forward since a 2% target was 
officially adopted, and in dotted blue is a hypothetical target from extrapolating the 2% 
backwards in time. The hypothetical is important for the United States, since it had long been 
noted that the Federal Reserve behaved as if it had a target of 2% even before this was 
decided. Comparing actual and expected, the conclusion for the United States, the Eurozone, 
and Canada is clear: monetary policy has been remarkably successful. For the United Kingdom, 
the price level drifted upwards after the crisis, although in its defense, the Bank of England 
interpreted its mandate as stating that bygones are bygones when it comes to past deviations, 
so that since 2011, the slope of the price level has been approximately on target.
Another way to judge the performance of macroeconomics as applied to central banking 
is through the response to the crises of the last decade. Macroeconomists did not prevent the 
crises, but following the collapse of Lehman or the Greek default, news reports were dominated 
by non-economists claiming that capitalism was about to end and all that we knew was no 
longer valid, while economists used their analytical tools to make sense of events and suggest 
policies. In the United States in 2007-08, the Federal Reserve, led by the certified academic 
macroeconomist Ben Bernanke, acted swiftly and decisively. In terms of its conventional 
instruments, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates as far as it could and announced it would 
keep them low for a very long time. Moreover, it saturated the market for reserves by paying 
interest on reserves, and it expanded its balance sheet in order to affect interest rates at many 
horizons. Finally, it adopted a series of unconventional policies, intervening in financial markets 
to prevent shortages of liquidity. Some of these decisions are more controversial than others, 
and some were more grounded in macroeconomic research than others. But overall, facing an 
adverse shock that seems to have been as serious as the one behind the Great Depression, 
monetary policy responded, and the economy recovered. While the recession was deep, it was 
nowhere as devastating as a depression. The economic profession had spent decades studying 
the Great Depression, and documenting the policy mistakes that contributed to its severity; 
these mistakes were all avoided in 2008-10.5
Figure 4. Actual price level and targets in four major central banks
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Turning to the Eurozone crisis, many agree that the intervention of the ECB in defending 
the euro “whatever it takes”, in Mario Draghi’s famous words, was decisive to prevent a collapse 
of European sovereign debt markets. In turn, while other European and national authorities had 
difficulty agreeing on a response to the crisis, the ECB intervened quickly and decisively, and 
the supply of credit stayed up, even in the periphery countries with banking problems. Again, 
most of the interventions, both in stopping the sovereign debt crisis, and in using longer-term 
liquidity interventions, were justified and based on academic papers in macroeconomics. 
Without taking credit away from the policymakers who had the courage to implement these 
policies, like the practical men in Keynes famous quote, they were following the principles of 
macroeconomists.6
A separate criticism of macroeconomic policy advice accuses it of being politically 
biased. Since the early days of the field, with Keynes and the Great Depression, 
macroeconomics was associated with aggressive and controversial policies and with 
researchers that wore other hats as public intellectuals. More recently, during the rational-
expectations microfoundations revolution of the 1970s, early papers had radical policy 
recommendations, like the result that all systematic aggregate-demand policy is ineffective, and 
some leading researchers had strong political views. Romer (2016) criticizes modern 
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macroeconomics for raising questions about what should be obvious truths, like the effect of 
monetary policy on output. He lays blame on the influence that Edward Prescott, Robert Lucas 
and Thomas Sargent had on field. Krugman (2009) in turn, claims the problem of 
macroeconomics is ideology, and in particular points to the fierce battles between different types 
of macroeconomists in the 1970s and 1980s, described by Hall (1976) in terms of saltwater 
versus freshwater camps. 
These features of the history of thought in macroeconomics are worth pointing out and 
discussing. But if they are crucial for diagnosing the state of the field, then they should stand out 
as very different from what happens in other fields in economics. Yet, labor economics also has 
a history of heated debates and strong ideological priors, as well as continuous re-examination 
of truths previously held as obvious, such as the effects of the minimum wage on employment 
or of immigration on wages.  The father figures of modern public economics, like Anthony 7
Atkinson, Joseph Stiglitz or Martin Feldstein, have also actively participated in popular debates 
with strong views in their role as public intellectuals.  Researchers in both fields make frequently 
policy prescriptions, and their work is picked up by the media. These fields have been publicly 
promoted by the profession more than that of macroeconomists: of the last ten John Bates Clark 
medallists, a prize given by the American Economic Association to honor economists under the 
age of 40, five of them have gone to researchers who list labor or public economics as one of 
their main fields of research.  Macroeconomics does not stand out from labor and public 8
economics in the features that the critics point out when they single it out for criticism.
The point is not claim there are weaknesses in different fields of economics. The point is 
rather to note that macroeconomics is not all that special relative to the other fields. Economists 
across all fields were in part surprised by the crisis, but also eager to study it and analyze it. 
Economic theorists understood that we needed to invest more time on  characterizing the role of 
speculation and sudden shifts in equilibrium, industrial organization economists turned their 
attention to auctions ran by central banks and to the operation of payment systems, and 
financial economists realized how little we had paid attention to understand rare events or to the 
measurement of systemic risk. There have been important debates on methods in development 
economics and in labor economics.  Researchers in these fields, as in macroeconomics, 9
perpetually feel unsatisfied with the state of their knowledge and work every day to improve it. 
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Data has expanded and progress was made, but this is true both in microeconomics and 
macroeconomics.
To conclude, some of the diagnoses of the crisis in macroeconomics presuppose that 
macroeconomics is very different from the rest of economics, in having an outsized influence on 
policy, having more ideological researchers, or being especially hit in its credibility and methods 
by the crisis. This section noted that this specialness of macroeconomics is more apparent than 
real. As such, explanations for the problems of macroeconomics today that are too field specific 
may miss the target.
IV. Poor forecasting yes, but relative to what?
One way that macroeconomics stands out from other fields in economics is in how often 
it produces forecasts. The vast majority of empirical models in economics can be very 
successful at identifying causal relations or at fitting behavior, but they are never used to provide 
unconditional forecasts, nor do people expect them to. Macroeconomists, instead, are asked to 
routinely produce forecasts to guide fiscal and monetary policy, and are perhaps too eager to 
comply. As I wrote in Reis (2010) “…by setting themselves the goal of unconditional forecasting 
of aggregate variables, macroeconomists are setting such a high bar that they are almost sure 
to fail.”
Forecasting is hard. Forecasting what people will do when their behavior is affected by 
many interrelated personal, local, and national variables is even harder. Forecasting when the 
forecasts cause changes in policy, which make people change their choices, which in turn make 
it required to revise the forecasts, is iteratively hard. Forecasting when economic agents 
themselves are forecasting your forecast to anticipate the policies that will be adopted involves 
strategic thinking and game theory that goes well beyond the standard statistical toolbox. Very 
few economists that I know of would defend themselves too vigorously against the frequent 
criticisms of forecasting failures by economists. As is regularly shown, macroeconomic forecasts 
come with large and often serially correlated errors.10
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At the same time, the way that forecasts are mis-read and mis-interpreted is part of the 
problem. As much as economists state that their forecasts are probabilities, and come with 
confidence bands, they are reported in the media always as point estimates. The Bank of 
England struggled to introduce fan charts as a way to display the uncertainty in its policy 
forecasts. Moreover, the supposedly most embarrassing forecast errors come with regards to 
large crises. Yet, these crises are rare events that happen once every many decades. Since 
typical economic time series only extend over a little more than one hundred years, statistically 
forecasting the eruption of a crisis will always come with large imprecision.11
Compare how economics does relative to the medical sciences. Analogies across 
sciences are always very tricky, and must be taken with a large grain of salt. Moreover, surely 
economists are still far from being as useful as dentists, like Keynes dreamed of, let alone to 
have made a contribution to human welfare that is close to the one by doctors or biologists. The 
comparison to make is much more narrow and limited, restricted only to how economic 
forecasts compare to medical forecasts.
Imagine going to your doctor and asking her to forecast whether you will be alive 2 years 
from now. That would sound like a preposterous request to the physician, but perhaps having 
some actuarial mortality tables in her head, she would tell you the probability of death for 
someone of your age. For all but the older readers of this article, this will be well below 50%. 
Yet, one year later, you have a heart attack and die. Should there be outrage at the state of 
medicine for missing the forecast, with such deadly consequences?
One defense by the medical profession would be to say that their job is not to predict 
time of death. They are driven to understand what causes diseases, how to prevent them, how 
to treat them, and altogether how to lower the chances of mortality while trading this off against 
life quality and satisfaction. Shocks are by definition unexpected, they cannot be predicted. In 
fact, in practice, most doctors would refuse to answer the question in the first place, or they 
would shield any forecast with a blank statement that anything can happen. This argument 
applies, word for word, to economics once the word disease is replaced by the words financial 
crisis.
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A more sophisticated defense would note that medical sciences are about making 
conditional forecasts: if you make some lifestyle choices, then your odds of dying change by this 
or that much. These forecasts are at best probabilistic. Medical science can quantify in terms of 
conditional probabilities how certain behaviors affect mortality. Moreover, once the disease sets 
in, health researchers have given us the tools to understand what just happened to your body, 
rationalize it, and predict which treatments have some chances of helping, with what side 
effects. These lead to better choices and to better treatments, and they are a major contribution 
of the biomedical sciences to knowledge and human welfare. 
Economics is not so different, even in 2007-08. Within days or weeks of the failure of 
Bear Sterns or Lehman Brothers, economists provided diagnoses of the crisis, and central 
banks and finance ministries implemented aggressive measures to minimize the damage, all of 
which were heavily influenced by economic theory. Economic concepts like asymmetric 
information, bank runs, the role of liquidity, saturating the market for reserves, and forward 
guidance at the zero lower bound, all provided concrete interpretations of the crisis, suggestions 
for policies, and discussion of trade-offs. The economy did not die, and a Great Depression was 
avoided, in no small part due to the advances on economics over many decades. 
Too many people all over the world are today being unexpectedly diagnosed with 
cancer, undergo enormously painful treatment, and recover to live for many more years. This is 
rightly hailed as a triumph of modern oncology, even if so much more remains to be done. After 
suffering the worst shock in many decades, the global economy’s problems were diagnosed by 
economists, who designed policies to respond to them, and in the end we had a painful 
recession but no melt down. Some, somehow, conclude that economics is at fault. 
At the same time, a doctor examining you in an emergency room can predict quite 
accurately how quickly the virus in your body will spread, and what the state of your health will 
be in 24 hours. Biologists and chemists can make remarkable sharp predictions on what will 
happen to your body after you take a certain medicine. Economists surely do not come even 
close to this. Perhaps, but the equivalent to these successes would be for me to crunch through 
the data on sales, customer characteristics, and others at the coffee shop downstairs, run many 
experiments varying the prices in the menu, and then use the economic model of a demand 
curve to predict what happens to coffee sales over the next week if we double the price. I 
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conjecture that the economic forecast would be quite good. Macroeconomists are instead asked 
to predict what will happen to the changes in the CPI or GDP over the next 1-5 years. The 
comparison of forecast quality must be made for the same time horizon and for a similar level of 
aggregation. The fairer comparison would be to ask doctors to predict what will be the 
percentage change in the annual number of patients that eventually die after being admitted to 
an emergency room due to a stroke. For these similar units, my guess is that medical forecasts 
will look almost as bad as macroeconomic forecasts.
Currently, the major and almost single public funder for economic research in the United 
States is the National Science Foundation. Its 2015 budget for the whole of social, behavioral 
and economic sciences was $276 million. The part attributed to its social and economic 
sciences group was $98 million. The main public funder of health studies in the United States is 
the National Institute of Health, but there are many more including several substantial private 
funders. The NIH’s budget for 2015 was $29 billion dollars. Its National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases alone received $4.2 billion in funding. A very conservative estimate is that 
society invests at least 40 times more trying to study infectious diseases, including forecasting 
the next flu season or the next viral outbreak, than it does in economics. More likely, the ratio of 
public investment to science devoted to predicting and preventing the next disease is two or 
even three orders of magnitude larger than the budget of science dedicated to predicting and 
preventing economics crises. There is no simple way to compare the output per unit of funding 
across different fields, but relative to its meager funding, the performance of economics 
forecasting is perhaps not so bad.
A detour for another comparison may drive the point of this section in. There has been 
much progress in weather forecasting, such that predicting the weather over the next few days 
is done with less uncertainty than it was a decade ago. Forecasting the weather is an activity 
that takes as many or more resources as forecasting the economy, and that also affects a series 
of policy choices and economic decisions. Comparing macroeconomic forecasts to forecasts of 
average temperature or precipitation over the next 1-5 years, as opposed to over the next few 
days, it is far from clear that economics forecasting is doing so poorly.
To conclude with the most important message, yes, economics models do a poor job 
forecasting macroeconomic variables. This deserves to be exposed, discussed, and even 
 20
sometimes ridiculed. Critics like Haldane (2016) are surely right, and the alternatives that they 
propose for improvement are definitely worth exploring. If nothing else, this may help the media 
and the public to start reporting and reading forecasts as probabilistic statements where the 
confidence bands or fan charts are as or more important than the point forecasts. But, before 
jumping to the conclusion that this is a damning critique of the state of macroeconomics, this 
section asked for an evaluation of forecasting performance in relative terms. Relative to other 
conditional predictions on the effectiveness of policies, relative to other forecasts for large 
diverse populations also made many years out, and relative to their accuracy per dollar of 
funding. From these perspectives, I am less convinced that economics forecasting is all that far 
behind other scientific fields.
V. Redirecting the criticisms to teaching macroeconomics
If I replace “macroeconomic research” with “macroeconomics as taught in entryway 
classes” in the critiques of macroeconomics, they seem more on point. The doubts raised in this 
essay applied to the descriptions of the state of our knowledge, or to what is current 
macroeconomic research. Like Rodrik (2015) in his overall defense of economics, the validity of 
the criticisms and the scope for reform seem much clearer to me in regards to how 
macroeconomics is taught and how it is used by policymakers. The popularity of criticisms of 
macroeconomics with the press and audiences in interdisciplinary debates likely has less to do 
with research, which most people know and care little about, but rather with their exposure to 
macroeconomics in the way it is taught and used in policy discussions.
At the undergraduate level, I see a productive debate taking place. The leading textbook 
in intermediate macroeconomics, Macroeconomics by N. G. Mankiw, is regularly revised, and 
many chapters changed significantly in the last decade to address the issues raised by the 
crisis. In the fringes, there are new entrants to this market and healthy competition of ideas and 
approaches, including more radical changes such as the one in the core-econ.org project. 
Macroeconomics is not alone here, as similar debates take place for instance in econometrics.12
At the graduate level, there is more room for improvement. To start, empirical work in 
macroeconomics today includes a rich set of tools and approaches. Macroeconomists need to 
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be trained in time series, and also to understand the fundamental identification problems, and 
the rich datasets that can be used to test behavior. There are classic empirical questions that 
one could structure an entire class in core macroeconomics around, and taking the model to the 
data is today not an after-thought but an integral part of almost all research projects. 
Macroeconomics could be taught in a much more data-driven way than what is done today.
Moreover, teaching is still tied to a benchmark frictionless neoclassical framework in the 
core graduate classes in macroeconomics, and this deserves to be questioned. Researchers in 
modern macroeconomics have made much progress in the last three decades to provide 
alternatives to the assumptions of full risk-sharing, full information, flexible prices, or lump-sum 
taxes, to name a few. For each of these assumptions, there are separate, tractable, simple, 
analytical models, that could be taught in an introductory class. The challenge is to bring these 
together in a bare-bones model that can provide a new benchmark. I put forward that spending 
more effort debating what should be in such a model and trying to write it down would lead to 
the highest marginal return produced by debates on the state of macroeconomics.
This is a debate worth having, especially as I am sure that many would disagree with 
what weight should empirical work have in the core sequence, or with what ingredients should 
be part of the core model. Criticisms and discussions of macroeconomics focussed on this 
discussion would be more constructive and get the wider community of macroeconomists 
involved. With more people pursuing graduate studies and higher demand for workers trained in 
advanced economic tools, graduate-level macroeconomics especially at the Masters level 
cannot be taught as if its only role was to train future academic researchers. As Mankiw (2006) 
and Blanchard (2017) emphasize, there is an important role for macroeconomists as engineers, 
as opposed to scientists, and this requires small usable models.
VI. A small contribution to the discussion of a new core model
A core model makes stark assumptions that make the model incredible, but also 
tractable and insightful on important economic mechanisms that are broadly applicable to many 
features of the world. The model should be simple, but it can still be richer than what it is today. 
It is especially important that it takes what are today seen as imperfections or frictions as the 
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benchmark, while it makes the flexible, full-information limits become the special cases. As a 
starting point for the discussion, a teacher could structure a core model as follows:13
1. Capitalists. A fraction of the population lives for many periods and has time-separable 
preferences between consumption and leisure with exponential discounting. They use funds to 
consume and to invest in a series of financial instruments, including equity, bonds, deposits, 
government bonds, as well as a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities. They collect income from 
owning these assets, taxed at a capital-income tax rate, and income from working, taxed at a 
labor-income tax rate.
Setting up and solving this intertemporal problem allows students to learn about dynamic 
optimization. The Euler equation with respect to bond holdings provides the vehicle to teach 
intertemporal consumption smoothing. The Euler equation with respect to equity holdings 
provides the pretext to discuss the equity premium, and portfolio choice more broadly. 
Combining these (and maybe others) teaches students about no-arbitrage opportunities and 
about the role of the stochastic discount factor. Finally, working through the set of Arrow-Debreu 
securities, one can introduce the concept of full risk sharing, what complete markets actually 
means, and basic aggregation theorems, culminating in the definition of a representative agent. 
Throughout, taxes can be dropped and reintroduced along the way, so that their distortionary 
effects are seen. Also throughout, there is empirical evidence on the equity premium, tests of 
risk sharing, the effects of distortionary taxes, and debates on what is behind the Frisch 
elasticity for a representative agent.
One ingredient that I have left out, and which deserves further discussion, is whether to 
have finite or infinite lives. In particular, one could discuss the infinitely-lived agent as a 
succession of generations that are altruistically linked, so the discount factor measures 
preferences for future children. This would allow a discussion the Blanchard-Yarii impure-
altruism model, which gives some of the insights from overlapping-generations models.
2. Workers. Another fraction of the population refers to workers. Ideally, a household could 
transition between the two types in the population, so the separation would not be so stark. 
Allowing for these transitions is too much for the core model, but would provide a good problem 
set. Workers have the same preferences as capitalists, over the same goods and paying similar 
taxes. However, they differ in two important regards.
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First, workers have idiosyncratic labor income shocks, perhaps because of shocks to 
their employment status and their health. These shocks lead to an income distribution and a 
discussion of inequality connected to the data. Moreover, they allow for a treatment of 
government transfers programs, tied to health and employment status, which dominate the 
government budget today. Ideally, one would have endogenous unemployment, providing a 
good contrast with exogenous health. This can be modeled with a version of a search and 
matching framework that makes stark assumption on how vacancies are posted and on 
separation, in order to keep the dynamics of unemployment simple.
Second, workers can only trade a bond between themselves, which is on net zero 
supply. Moreover, they are subject to a “maximally tight” borrowing constraint, whereby they 
cannot borrow. Solving their problem introduces students to the standard incomplete-markets 
models and to precautionary savings. These can be taught by inspecting the Euler equation of 
this problem. Moreover, the equation has an easy solution: the joint assumptions of a bond in 
zero net supply and no-borrowing constraints, imply that in equilibrium every worker has zero 
savings. This matches the empirical evidence that a large fraction of the population has zero 
wealth, and can be used to discuss identification problems between this model and the 
Keynesian hand-to-mouth model, which assumes, rather than derive, zero savings. Clearing the 
market for the bonds gives an equation for the interest rate that moves with precautionary 
savings.
Left out is housing. Ideally, for both for capitalists and workers, one would include a third 
good, beyond consumption and leisure, that is durable. This would allow students to understand 
the concept of user costs, and to understand how a good can also be an illiquid asset. 
Moreover, this would allow for a discussion of the empirically important connection between 
housing and borrowing.
3. Goods producing firms. A continuum of firms exists, each producing a variety of consumer 
goods that are assembled according to a costant-elasticity aggregator. Each firm hires labor and 
capital goods to produce under a neoclassical production function. They are monopolistically 
competitive, and students can learn from their problem about the pricing choices of a 
monopolist.
Importantly, each firm sets its price only infrequently because of nominal rigidities. The 
simplest way to model them, which is not easily rejected by the data, and so can be discussed 
together with empirical evidence, is to assume sticky information. Each period a randomly 
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drawn fraction of firms update their information, while the remainder keep to old price plans. 
Class discussions and evidence on rational expectations can happen at this stage. The model 
allows for a simple derivation of the Phillips curve relating marginal costs to inflation, and the 
importance of this relation in the history of macroeconomic thought.
Here, one can also discuss entry of firms subject to fixed costs and entry lags, together 
with exogenous  firm exit. Under stark assumptions, this model of endogenous variety can be 
made simple with limited dynamics over time. It allows for a discussion of markups and of basic 
firm dynamics. It can also be extended to give a brief discussion of innovation and endogenous 
growth.
4. Capital producing firms and banks. A competitive sector produces capital goods but must 
borrow funds from banks. There are many banks, and each has an individual net worth that it 
can accumulate over time, subject to an exogenous end of life, and the payment of dividends to 
the capitalist owners. The relations between banks and other agents are subject to incentive 
constraints, which reflect themselves in different forms. Banks cannot take on outside equity, but 
only deposits, from capitalists. They attract these deposits and make loans subject to a leverage 
constraint derived from their ability to abscond with part of the funds. One can also discuss 
here, and introduce, adjustment costs to investment, together with restrictions on borrowing that 
are linked to the value of collateral. 
Financial institutions would enter the core model using the tools of limited commitment. 
They can be complemented with a discussion of liquidity in financial markets. The basics of new 
monetarist models can be discussed, as banks may be subject to idiosyncratic withdrawal 
shocks, and at the same time borrow from each other in interbank markets that are modeled as 
being over the counter and requiring search for counter parties.
5. The government. One branch of the government is the fiscal authority. It chooses taxes for 
labor and capital, collects dividends from the central bank, and finances social transfers as well 
as government purchases. Students can be taught about (naive) hyperbolic discounting by 
considering policymakers that are tempted by the present because of elections and rotation in 
power. This allows for a potential conflict between the government and the private sector, and 
allows for the government to not be treated as benevolently as benchmark models today do.
The other branch of the government is the central bank, which is independent, and so 
has its own budget constraint and set of tools.  Discussing the fiscal backing of the central bank, 
 25
or in other words its effective independence, one can introduce students to hyperinflation and 
the informative data that result from these episodes. This section of the core can then focus on 
how central banks control inflation, by discussing the determination of the price level in general 
equilibrium. It also allows one to teach the history of inflation across the world.
6. DSGE. Finally, all of these parts can be brought together in a DSGE. Note that, in each of the 
segments that I discussed, after going over the micro foundations and exploring several topics, 
one is left with only one or two key equations. Therefore, by the end, there are probably only 
about ten or so equations left. Teaching students how to solve these as a system, through the 
tools of linearization, likelihood and filtering, and culminating with estimation, would complete 
the class and connect its different ingredients to the data on business-cycle fluctuations and the 
effect of fiscal and monetary policy.
Note that in each these parts, there is one or two parameters that can be set to some 
limit (say zero) and in doing so recover the frictionless rational-expectations growth model. If the 
fraction of workers goes to zero, tax rates are zero, the degree of information rigidity is zero, 
firm entry costs are zero, banks can abscond with zero of the depositors’ money, the fiscal 
authority has no present bias, and so on, then one recovers the core model that currently 
dominates. But, and this is the main point, this is now a special case, rather than the 
benchmark. Moreover stated as this limit, it becomes clear how much this old core leaves out, 
and how rich is the modern macroeconomics that builds on the new core. 
I am sure that almost every reader of this article will disagree with at least one of the 
ingredients I listed above, or have a favorite one that should be included. Myself, I doubt that if I 
were to teach such a class for a few years, I would not conclude that some ingredients are best 
left out, and others should be brought in. My point here is not to provide the answer to what a 
new graduate core should be, but to show that there can be one. In the description above, I 
used core models that are taught in the first few weeks of field classes in macroeconomics with 
financial frictions, incomplete markets, or monetary economics. What remains is to bring them 
together as a core, as opposed to a disparate collection of benchmarks for different subfields of 
macroeconomics. It will take some effort to move beyond the brief description above, but this 
seems feasible. Organizing conferences where these ingredients are debated, and providing 
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incentives for researchers to pedagogically defend their versions of core models, would be a 
fruitful future path for debates on the state of macro.
VII. Conclusion
I have argued that while there is much that is wrong with macroeconomics today, most 
critiques of the state of macroeconomics are off target. Current macroeconomic research is not 
mindless DSGE modeling filled with ridiculous assumptions and oblivious of data. Rather, young 
macroeconomists are doing vibrant, varied, and exciting work, getting jobs, and being 
published. Macroeconomics informs economic policy only moderately and not more nor all that 
differently than other fields in economics. Monetary policy has benefitted significantly from this 
advice in keeping inflation under control and preventing a new Great Depression. 
Macroeconomic forecasts perform poorly in absolute terms and given the size of the challenge 
probably always will. But relative to the level of aggregation, the time horizon, and the amount of 
funding, macroeconomic forecasts are not so obviously worse than those in other fields. What is 
most wrong with macroeconomics today is perhaps that there is too little discussion of which 
models to teach and too little investment in graduate-level textbooks. 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